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DEPOLITICIZING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
CASS R. SUNSTEINt
THOMAS J. MILEStt
ABSTRACT
A large body of empirical evidence demonstrates that judicial
review of agency action is highly politicized in the sense that
Republican appointees are significantly more likely to invalidate
liberal agency decisions than conservative ones, while Democratic
appointees are significantly more likely to invalidate conservative
agency decisions than liberal ones. These results hold for both (a)
judicial review of agency interpretations of law and (b) judicial review
of agency decisions for "arbitrariness" on questions of policy and
fact. On the federal courts of appeals, the most highly politicized
voting patterns are found on unified panels, that is, on panels
consisting solely of either Democratic or Republican appointees. On
the Supreme Court, politicized administrative law is also
unmistakable, as the more conservative Justices show a distinctive
willingness to vote to invalidate liberal agency decisions, and the more
liberal Justices show a distinctive willingness to vote to invalidate
conservative agency decisions. Indeed, it is possible to "rank" Justices
in terms of the extent to which their voting patterns are politicized.
The empirical results raise an obvious question: what might be done
to depoliticize administrative law? Three sets of imaginable solutions
have promise: (1) self-correction without formal doctrinal change,
produced by a form of "debiasing" that might follow from a clearer
judicial understanding of the current situation; (2) doctrinal
innovations, as, for example, through rethinking existing deference
principles and giving agencies more room to maneuver; and (3)
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institutional change, through novel voting rules and requirements of
mixed panels. Each of these solutions runs into significant problems,
though the evidence suggests that mixed panels would greatly reduce
politicized voting. An investigation of these solutions has implications
for other domains in which judges are divided along political lines,
and indeed in which nonjudicial officials, including members of
regulatory commissions, show some kind of politicized division or
bias. In multiple areas, politicized voting might be reduced through
disclosure of existing patterns, through doctrinal changes, or through
institutional change.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a parallel world, very much like our own. In this world,
administrative law is radically politicized. If the question is the
legality of an agency's interpretation of a statutory term, the court's
answer can be predicted by asking about the political affiliation of the
president who appointed the judges on the panel. If the question is
whether an agency's decision is arbitrary or capricious, the court's
answer can be predicted in the same way. In such a world, the crudest
versions of legal realism would be vindicated: whatever the formal
doctrine, the outcome of disputes in administrative law would be a
product of the judges' political predilections. Administrative law
would be purely a matter of judicial politics.
Fortunately, that world is not our own. Disputes about the
legality of agency action cannot be predicted in so simple a fashion.'
Unfortunately, however, that world has something in common with
our own.2 At least in the last three administrations-under Presidents
George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush-
administrative law has been highly politicized in the sense that on the
courts of appeals, the evidence reveals sharp divisions between
Republican and Democratic appointees in a way that fits
1. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825 (2006) [hereinafter Miles &
Sunstein, Do Judges]; Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness
Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 768 (2008) [hereinafter Miles & Sunstein, Real World].
2. For a seminal study, see generally Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation,
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997). For a valuable study of the Supreme
Court, see generally William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008).
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uncomfortably well with ideological stereotypes.3 Under President
George W. Bush, politicized voting was quite visible: a panel of
Democratic appointees was especially likely to strike down
conservative decisions from the Bush administration, and a panel
consisting solely of Republican appointees was especially likely to
uphold such decisions.4
On the Supreme Court, the situation has been similar not only
under the Bush administration, but for the last decade and more.5
Some members of the Court-above all, Justices Clarence Thomas
and John Paul Stevens-show highly ideological voting patterns in
the sense that their willingness to vote to validate an agency's
interpretation of law can be predicted, much of the time, by asking
whether the interpretation is conservative or liberal.6 In the last eight
years, politicization of the administrative state and the judiciary has
been a significant source of public concern, and recent judicial
behavior, in administrative law, shows a high degree of politicized
voting.
To say the least, this seems to be a disturbing and somewhat
embarrassing state of affairs. Whatever one's view of the foundational
questions in administrative law, no one should approve of a situation
in which judicial voting patterns are highly politicized.7 On the
contrary, it is reasonable to read existing doctrines as an explicit
3. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 2, at 1147; Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges, supra note 1, at
851; Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 1, at 767. These essays, focused on administrative
law, should be seen as part of a large and growing area of empirical study. For a discussion and
of this area and citations to relevant pieces, see generally Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein,
The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2008).
4. Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges, supra note 1, at 836.
5. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 2, at 1153-57.
6. See Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges, supra note 1, at 851; see also Eskridge & Baer, supra
note 2, at 1156-57 (detailing a somewhat different set of numbers spanning over a longer period
of time).
7. If agency decisions have an ideological skew, of course, it might be desirable to have a
high level of invalidations; and if the agency's skew leads to a high level of unlawful "liberal"
decisions, then a percentage of invalidation of such decisions would be nothing to deplore. The
problem is that even if agency decisions are skewed in one or another direction, a large and
predictable split between Republican and Democratic appointees would be hard to defend, and
would justify a high level of concern.
Of course we are aware that one person's skew is another person's neutral principle; if,
for example, the Environmental Protection Agency takes a proenvironmental turn, or the
National Labor Relations Board becomes more sensitive to the interests of employers, there
would be no "skew" from the right point of view. We do not mean to say anything controversial
on this count; we use the term "skew" as a simple placeholder for agency departures from the
correct approach to the relevant area of the law.
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effort to prevent such patterns from emerging. Most prominently,
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.8
establishes that courts must uphold agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutory provisions so long as those interpretations are
reasonable. 9 Chevron is naturally read to say that resolution of
statutory ambiguities calls for a policy judgment,"° with the suggestion
that such judgments should be made by administrators, not judges.1' It
is disconcerting, to say the least, to find that when judges review
agency interpretations of law, judicial policy judgments continue to be
playing a significant role.
Or consider Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,12 which specifies how judges are to
evaluate agency decisions challenged as arbitrary or capricious under
the Administrative Procedure Act.3 State Farm asks judges to
invalidate agency failure to investigate reasonable alternatives or to
provide an adequate justification for a particular course of action. 4 It
should go without saying that the State Farm framework is designed
to discipline agency decisions, not to give free reign to judicial policy
preferences. Agency decisions are supposed to be invalidated because
they are not based on an adequate justification, not because judges
disagree with them on the merits. In these circumstances, it is
disturbing to find that whether a court of appeals is likely to find an
agency decision to be "arbitrary" depends, in significant part, on
whether the panel consists of Republican or Democratic appointees. 5
The official doctrine opposes politicized judging; the practice plainly
reveals what the doctrine explicitly opposes.
As we shall see, objections to the apparently politicized voting
turn out to raise many questions, and it would be possible to wonder
whether the current situation is as troublesome as it initially appears.
But politicized voting patterns create an evident problem for the rule
of law, if only because similarly situated people, including some of the
nation's most important institutions, are not being treated similarly.
8. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
9. Id. at 843-44.
10. See E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles
of Congress, Courts, and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 8 (2005).
11. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864.
12. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
13. Id. at 43; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
14. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 37-38.
15. See Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 1, at 812.
[Vol. 58:21932196
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After all, judges are randomly assigned to three-judge panels. 16 If all-
Republican panels are likely to strike down liberal regulations from
the Environmental Protection Agency, and if all-Democratic panels
are likely to uphold such regulations, the random assignment of
judges is playing a significant role. And if Supreme Court review is
unusual, it is troubling to find that the fate of an important domain of
environmental law will turn on the composition of the appellate
panel.
The current evidence also offers a warning for the future.
Suppose that the federal judiciary consists in large part of appointees
of George W. Bush, and that in its initial years, an Obama
administration is issuing a large number of regulations that reflect the
political commitments of that very president. If politicized voting
occurs on the federal judiciary, those commitments will run into
serious trouble before Republican appointees-and there will be
many such appointees. At first glance, a set of invalidations would
seem disturbing from the standpoint of democratic self-governance,
whatever one's views about George W. Bush and Barack Obama.
We have three purposes in this Article. The first is to set out in
one place some of the most revealing evidence on politicized
administrative law, with the hope that a brief overview of key findings
will help to show what is wrong with the existing state of affairs. The
second is to investigate a series of interpretive questions, which raises
issues about how to construe the evidence, and about how seriously
the current problem should be taken. The third is to explore several
sets of potential remedies. One solution involves judicial self-
correction without doctrinal change; another requires doctrinal
innovations, for example through heightened deference requirements;
another solution requires institutional change, for example through
requiring mixed panels in certain cases; yet another calls for changes
in the confirmation process.
One of the largest lessons is that while the problem of politicized
administrative law is unmistakable, there are serious difficulties with
each of the imaginable solutions. For example, a general increase in
16. See 28 U.S.C § 46 (2006) (providing for panels consisting of three judges without
specifying a method of assignment); Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal
for Improving American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 216-17 (1999) (explaining that random
assignment has been widely adopted in the federal appellate system, by rule or practice, as it is
thought to limit intracircuit judge shopping and ensure even caseload distribution among
judges).
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judicial deference to agency judgments would help to reduce
politicized invalidations, but it would also remove some of the
beneficial features of the current situation, in which a strong judicial
hand disciplines arbitrariness at the agency level.17 Increased
deference would increase politicized validations, which may well be a
serious problem. The data suggest that mixed panels would be the
most effective corrective,'8 but an approach of that kind would
present serious administrative challenges and also have potentially
undesirable side effects. Fortunately, some of the potential solutions
would provide significant help without compromising important
values.
A clarification before we proceed: many people are concerned
about the politicization of administrative law in a quite different sense
from our understanding here. In their view, a serious problem lies in
the role of "politics," understood as interest-group power, over the
administrative state, especially in domains in which technical
expertise should prevail. 9  On this view, the problem of
"politicization" consists in insufficient regard for specialized
knowledge. This is a legitimate and important concern, but it is an
independent topic. Even if the judgments of administrative agencies
sometimes reflect an excessive role for politics, in a pejorative sense,
it remains important to ensure that judicial review of agency action
does not radically differ depending on whether Republican
appointees or Democratic appointees are on the panel.0 Our goal
here is to see how that task might be accomplished.
While our focus throughout is on administrative law, we hope
that our elaboration of the problem, of the interpretive issues, and of
the potential solutions will bear on many areas in which judicial
voting is highly politicized2 or in which public officials or others are
divided along some controversial dimension or show some kind of
17. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or "The Deciders"-Courts in Administrative Law, 75
U. CHI. L. REV. 815,823 (2008).
18. See infra notes 35-36, 46 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., THOMAS 0. MCGARrrY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: How
SPECIAL INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 2-7 (2008).
20. Recall the theoretical possibility that if agencies show a predictable skew (in the sense
that they are biased in some objectionable way), then some sort of skew, on the part of courts,
might be necessary to ensure neutrality. The problem is that it cannot be the case that both
Republican and Democratic appointees are supplying a corrective to any skew-they disagree,
and hence cannot both be right!
21. See FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 11-38
(2007); CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? 87-106 (2006).
2198 [Vol. 58:2193
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bias. In any domain, self-corrective, doctrinal innovation, or
institutional change might provide significant help. In some domains,
one or another of these solutions might have more promise than in
the context of administrative law.
I. POLITICIZED ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: EVIDENCE
A. Method
For a number of years, we have been studying judicial judgments
in the domain of administrative law, in an effort to see whether those
judgments reflect policy choices on the part of federal judges.22 For
present purposes, our method can be simply described.
Within the courts of appeals, our focus has been on judicial
review of decisions by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). 3 This approach
has the advantage of investigating one important executive agency
(the EPA) and one important independent agency (the NLRB); this
approach also presents certain advantages in terms of ease of coding.
There are of course real difficulties in deciding how to "code" agency
decisions in political terms. It is hard to undertake such coding in the
abstract; it is even harder to do so when the real question is not
whether the agency has proceeded in a "liberal" fashion, but how the
particular controversy, before a court, should be evaluated in political
terms. Let us begin by describing our choice and then explaining it.
In brief, we attempted to categorize agency decisions as "liberal"
or "conservative" by asking whether the challenge was made by a
company or instead by a public interest group or a labor union.24 If,
for example, the Sierra Club objected to an EPA decision, the
22. See generally Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges, supra note 1 (outlining the studies and
reporting the results); Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 1 (same).
23. In the case of agency interpretations of law, we examined all cases citing Chevron
between 1990 and 2004 (253 in total); in the case of arbitrariness review, we examined all
arbitrariness and substantial evidence cases between 1996 and 2006 (653 in total).
24. We also studied whether the agency's decision was issued in a Republican or
Democratic administration. In some domains, we found that Republican appointees are more
likely to vote to uphold decisions of a Republican administration than those of a Democratic
administration, and that Democratic appointees show a similar kind of favoritism. In Chevron
cases, for example, Democratic appointees show a 70 percent validation rate under Democratic
administrations and 61 percent validation rate under Republican administrations, while
Republican appointees show a 59 percent validation rate under Democratic administrations and
a 68 percent validation rate under Republican administration. Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges,
supra note 1, at 850. In general, however, the liberal-conservative coding is a more accurate way
of exploring political voting on the courts of appeals, and so that division is our emphasis here.
2199
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decision was coded as conservative; if General Motors made the
objection, the decision was coded as liberal. This method has several
important advantages. It greatly simplifies the coding exercise, avoids
controversial judgments that might divide reviewers, and thus
improves administrability and replicability. It can also be defended in
principle. What matters is not whether the agency's decision is liberal
or conservative in the abstract, but the political valence of the
particular challenge before the court. If, for example, the EPA has
issued a ruling that some people consider "liberal," but that is
challenged by a public interest group that is attempting to increase
regulation, the ruling is relevantly conservative, in the sense that
judges are being asked to hold that it is unlawfully weak.
Admittedly, however, our proxy is crude. For that reason, we
read all of the cases ourselves. When our method produced what
seemed to be an incorrect or contestable result, we adjusted the
coding accordingly. Suppose, for example, that a public interest group
challenged the agency's decision, but that the group was conservative,
and sought to block regulatory action. If so, we reversed the
categorization; such reversals occurred in a relatively small number of
cases (under a dozen). If coding proved difficult, because of the range
of issues and the number of parties, the case was dropped on the
ground that no coding was reliable; we dropped only a few cases
(about ten).
For purposes of evaluating our data, it is important to know the
distribution of liberal and conservative decisions. In the domains that
we studied, EPA decisions were evenly split between conservative
and liberal rulings;25 recall that this means that public interest groups
challenged EPA decisions at about the same rate that companies did.
NLRB decisions, by contrast, were disproportionately liberal-67
percent in Chevron cases, and 94 percent in arbitrariness cases.26 The
overwhelming majority of challenges to NLRB decisions, in the
27courts of appeals, are brought by employers rather than unions.
We also examined whether judicial votes were issued by
Republican or Democratic appointees to the federal bench, with the
hypothesis that the division should operate as a proxy for political
predilections and with the further thought that the effect of the
political affiliation of the appointing president is of considerable
25. Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 1, at 777.
26. Id.
27. Id.
2200 [Vol. 58:2193
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independent interest. With this method, we can investigate "liberal
voting rates" for Democratic and Republican appointees in different
domains. We can also compare the validation rate of both sets of
appointees for conservative agency decisions and for liberal agency
decisions. In addition to studying the effects of party, we can study
the effects of panels by asking whether the votes of Democratic or
Republican appointees are affected by the political affiliation of the
president who appointed the two other judges on the panel. Do
Democratic appointees show especially liberal voting patterns when
they sit only with other Democratic appointees? How do the voting
patterns of Republican appointees differ depending on whether they
are sitting with no, one, or two Democratic appointees?
The baseline case, for purposes of studying neutrality and
partisanship, would show no significant disparities between
Republican and Democratic appointees. If no such disparities were
shown, existing administrative law doctrines would be "working" in
the sense that they would be serving to filter out any effect from the
most obvious and salient difference among appointees to the federal
bench. And indeed, there are important areas of federal law in which
partisan differences are not observed.
For the Supreme Court, we took a similar approach. Here,
however, we examined all decisions that cited Chevron; we did not
restrict ourselves to the EPA or the NLRB. And instead of
distinguishing between Republican and Democratic appointees, we
assessed voting patterns for each of the individual Justices and (to
obtain greater statistical power) for "blocks" of Justices
corresponding to conventional judgments about ideological divisions.
With this approach, we are able to see if political predilections affect
the Justices' voting in administrative law cases. Because only a small
number of "arbitrariness" cases reach the Supreme Court, making
statistical tests impossible, we did not investigate those cases.
B. Courts of Appeals: Chevron Cases
Within the courts of appeals, politicized voting is unmistakable in
Chevron cases. Consider three different ways to demonstrate this
point:
2& See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 21, at 48-54 (finding no significant effects of political
party in criminal appeals, federalism, takings, punitive damages, and standing).
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1. When the agency's decision is liberal, the Democratic
validation rate is 74 percent; when the agency's decision is
conservative, the Democratic validation rate falls to 51
percent. The pattern is the opposite for Republican
appointees-very close to the mirror image. When the
agency's decision is liberal, the Republican validation rate is
59.5 percent. When the agency's decision is conservative, the
Republican validation rate jumps to 70 percent. 9
2. When the agency's decision is liberal, Democratic appointees
are 14 percent more likely to vote to validate it than are
Republican appointees. When the agency's decision is
conservative, Democratic appointees are 19 percent less likely
to validate it than are Republican appointees."
3. The overall liberal voting rate is 67 percent for Democratic
appointees; for Republican appointees, it is 50 percent.3'
To be sure, differences of these magnitudes are inconsistent with
the proposition that in administrative law cases judicial voting is
thoroughly politicized. It remains true that Republican appointees
vote to uphold liberal interpretations well over 50 percent of the time,
and that Democratic appointees are more likely than not to uphold
conservative interpretations. Nonetheless, the disparities are
significant. What produces them?
Intriguingly, they are driven in large part by the radically
different behavior of both sets of appointees on unified panels -that
is, panels consisting solely of Democratic appointees (DDD panels)
or solely of Republican appointees (RRR panel). When Democratic
appointees are on DDD panels, the validation rate for liberal agency
decisions is 86 percent; when Democratic appointees are on DDD
panels, the validation rate for conservative agency decisions is 54
percent.32 (This 32 percent difference should be compared with the
overall difference of 23 percent.33) When Republican appointees are
on RRR panels, the validation rate for liberal agency decisions is 51
percent; and on such panels, the validation rate for conservative
agency decision is a remarkable 100 percent.3
29. Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges, supra note 1, at 849.
30. Id. at 826-27.
31. Id. at 859.
32. Id. at 855.
33. Id.
34. Id.
[Vol. 58:21932202
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Because of the relatively small sample size, the particular
numbers here should be taken with a grain of salt, but they should be
sufficient to show that unified panels are playing a large role in
driving the results. The following point is sufficiently important to
deserve italics: On mixed panels, politicized voting is greatly reduced;
the behavior of Democratic appointees, on such panels, is very close to
that of Republican appointees.35 In Chevron cases, the voting patterns
of Republican appointees on RRD panels is close to the voting
patterns of Republican appointees on RDD panels, and the voting
patterns of Democratic appointees on DRR panels is close to that of
Democratic appointees on DDR panels-and more remarkably still,
all four voting patterns are close to one another?6 This finding
suggests that on mixed panels, Chevron is essentially working, in the
sense that politicized voting is modest at best.
The dramatic difference between all-Republican and all-
Democratic panels presents an obvious puzzle. Why are judicial
voting patterns relatively extreme on such panels and so much more
moderate on mixed panels? We lack a complete answer, but judges
appear to be influenced by the process of group polarization, which
occurs when group members end up in a more extreme position in
line with their predeliberation tendencies.37 Group polarization is the
typical pattern within deliberating groups, and it occurs in a wide
range of settings.38 If Democratic appointees show especially liberal
voting patterns on panels consisting solely of Democratic appointees,
it is likely because the judges' initial inclinations are amplified, rather
than moderated, by learning about the conclusions and arguments of
other judges. On mixed panels, by contrast, a whistleblower effect
may occur, in the form of presentation of counterarguments based
(for example) on the principle of Chevron deference. 3 Because the
initial "argument pool" is different on a DDD panel from what it is
on a DDR panel, it should not be entirely surprising that Democratic
35. Id. at 863.
36. Id.
37. ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 200-45 (2d ed. 1995); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY
SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 111-44 (2003).
38. See BROWN, supra note 37, at 244.
39. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2173-74 (1998).
2203
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appointees, on the latter kinds of panels, show relatively greater
moderation.40
C. Courts of Appeals: Arbitrariness Cases
The pattern is strikingly similar in arbitrariness cases. Here the
question is not whether the agency's decision conforms to the
governing statute, but whether its judgments of policy or fact are
arbitrary on the merits (or unsupported by substantial evidence).
Return to our three key tests for politicized voting, and notice the
closely analogous pattern in Chevron cases:
1. When the agency's decision is liberal, the Democratic
validation rate is 72 percent; when the agency's decision is
conservative, the rate falls to 55 percent. The pattern is the
opposite for Republican appointees-very close to the mirror
image. When the agency's decision is liberal, the validation
rate is 58 percent; when the agency's decision is conservative,
the validation rate jumps to 72 percent.41
2. When the agency's decision is liberal, Democratic appointees
are 14 percent more likely to vote to validate it than are
Republican appointees. When the agency's decision is
conservative, Democratic appointees are 17 percent less likely
to validate it than are Republican appointees.42
3. The overall liberal voting rate is 69 percent for Democratic
appointees; for Republican appointees, it is 56 percent.
43
One of the most striking features of these findings is their
similarity to those under Chevron; different areas of administrative
law have produced parallel voting patterns. And here too, unified
panels explain a significant part of these disparities. On politically
unified panels of Democratic appointees, the average validation rate
is 43 percentage points higher when the agency decision is liberal than
when it is conservative.' And on politically unified panels of
40. There are other possible explanations. It may be, for example, that Republican and
Democratic appointees vote as they would as individuals on unified panels, and that what needs
explanation is the absence of politicized voting on mixed panels. On this view, group
polarization is not involved; mixed panels serve to moderate judges' tendencies, and that is the
key mechanism. For our purposes, it does not seem necessary to settle on a final explanation.
41. Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 1, at 767.
42. Id. at 777.
43. Id. at 791.
44. Id. at 788.
2204 [Vol. 58:2193
HeinOnline  -- 58 Duke L.J. 2204 2008-2009
2009] DEPOLITICIZING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Republican appointees, the average validation rate is 29 percentage
points lower when the agency decision is liberal than when it is
conservative.45 A form of group polarization seems to be at work in
this domain. On mixed panels, by contrast, the partisan differences
are greatly muted,46  perhaps because of a moderating or
whistleblower effect. In those panels, existing doctrine is again
"working," in the sense that judges' arbitrariness judgments do not
greatly differ depending on the political affiliation of the appointing
president.
D. The Supreme Court47
1. The Least and Most Partisan Justices. The data on the
Supreme Court allows individual comparisons among the Court's
members. 8 Indeed, it is even possible to rank the Justices in terms of
partisanship in Chevron cases. 9 In this domain, it would seem
reasonable to define the least partisan Justices as those who show the
most similar validation rates for liberal and conservative agency
decisions. By contrast, the most partisan might be defined as those
who show the largest spreads between the two validation rates.
Under this test, Justice Kennedy emerges as the least partisan of
the sitting Justices; he is equally likely to vote to invalidate
conservative and liberal agency decisions. ° Justice Thomas emerges
as the most partisan; remarkably, he is 46 percent more likely to vote
to invalidate liberal agency decisions than conservative agency
decisions." Justice John Paul Stevens is not far behind, with a
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Seven of the Justices were appointed by Republican presidents: Justice David H.
Souter, Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy,
Justice William H. Rehnquist, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Antonin Scalia. Justices
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Steven Breyer were appointed by Democratic President Clinton.
48. For an illuminating treatment, covering a large time period, see Eskridge & Baer, supra
note 2, at 1153-57.
49. Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges, supra note 1, at 872-80 tbl.1. The data set extends from
1989 to 2005, and hence Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito are not included.
An effort to extend the study to the present would of course include a number of their votes,
but the sample size, for those Justices, would remain too small to permit reliable comparisons.
50. Id. at 877 tbl.1.
51. Id. at 880 tbl.1.
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stunning 40 percent difference in favor of liberal decisions. 2 Consider
the following table: 3
Table 1. Partisan Voting in Chevron Cases on the Supreme Court.
Justice Gap Type of Agency
(in percentage points) Decision Favored
Thomas 46 Conservative
Stevens 40 Liberal
Scalia 27 Conservative
Breyer 26 Liberal
Ginsburg 23 Liberal
Rehnquist 21 Conservative
O'Connor 14 Conservative
Souter 14 Liberal
Kennedy 1
To be sure, this table should be taken with many grains of salt.
The sample size is small, and for Justices O'Connor, Souter, and
Kennedy, the gap is not statistically significant (and hence they could
plausibly be said to share the prize for nonpartisan voting). Moreover,
it is important to examine not only the size of the gap, but also the
rate of invalidation; if a Justice shows a large gap, but is also willing to
uphold both liberal and conservative decisions at a high rate, then the
problem of partisanship is diminished.
It turns out that Justice Breyer shows the highest validation rate
(82 percent), ' while Justice Scalia shows the lowest (52 percent).5
The point greatly matters because Justice Breyer's validation rate
remains reasonably high for conservative decisions (64 percent), 6 as
does that of Justice Ginsburg (58 percent). 7 By contrast, Justice
Scalia's validation rate for liberal decisions is a meager 42 percent. It
emerges that the existence of a significant partisan gap may coexist
52. Id. at 872 tbl.1.
53. Id. at 872-80 tbl.1.
54. Id. at 874 tbl..
55. Id. at 879 tbl.1.
56. Id. at 874 tbl.1.
57. Id. at 875 tbl.1.
58. Id. at 879 tbl.1.
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with a relatively high validation rate for the "other side." Consider
the following table:59
Table 2. Validation Rates in Chevron Cases on the Supreme Court.
Justice Rate (percentage points)
Breyer 82
Souter 77
Ginsburg 74
Stevens 71
O'Connor 68
Kennedy 67
Rehnquist 64
Thomas 54
Scalia 52
Here too, however, the individual rankings must be taken with
many grains of salt. The sample size is too small to make most of the
individual differences statistically significant. But it is both intriguing
and suggestive to find that the four most liberal Justices have the
highest validation rates, while the three most conservative Justices
have the lowest.
2. Conservative Partisans, Liberal Partisans. The individual
rankings may be entertaining, but for purposes of understanding of
operation of existing doctrine, it is more instructive to place the
Court's members into groups and to examine the differences between
them.
Let us compare the Rehnquist-Scalia-Thomas group with the
Breyer-Ginsburg-Souter-Stevens group. The former group, consisting
of the most conservative Justices, shows a validation rate of 76
percent when the agency's decision is conservative-but a
corresponding rate of just 45.5 percent when the agency's decision is
liberal.6° This difference of 30.5 percent shows a remarkable effect of
judicial policy preferences. The picture is not fundamentally different
for the Breyer-Ginsburg-Souter-Stevens group. When the agency
decision is liberal, the validation rate is 85 percent-but when it is
conservative, the rate falls to 58 percent. 6' The disparity here is 27
percent, very close to that on the Rehnquist-Scalia-Thomas side. In
59. Id. at 872-80 tbl.1.
60. Id. at 835.
61. Id.
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contrast, for the two more centrist members of the Court, Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor, the partisan gap is small, with a 65 percent
validation rate for liberal agency decisions and a 72 percent validation
rate for conservative agency decisions; that 7 percent difference is not
statistically significant. 62
Partisan voting is readily apparent in the Supreme Court in
Chevron cases, but as with individual measures, it is important to look
at overall validation rates, not merely at gaps. Notably, the overall
validation rate for Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg is 75
percent, significantly higher than the 57 percent rate for Rehnquist,
Scalia, and Thomas.63 The former group votes to validate conservative
agency decisions at a 58 percent rate, which is significantly higher
than the 45.5 percent validation rate for liberal agency decisions from
the latter group.4
3. A Brief Note on Politics, Judicial Review, and the Future. In
light of the existing data, we can venture some predictions about the
future. Suppose that a future administration issues a range of liberal
decisions (in the sense that they are challenged by regulated
industries). Such an administration will be highly vulnerable before
RRR panels, and will be likely to do far better before DDD panels.
To the extent that the federal courts of appeals consist of a strong
majority of Republican appointees, an administration that issues
many liberal decisions will have special difficulty in prevailing. This is
a purely predictive point; of course people will differ about whether
and to what extent it would be a cause for concern.
Within the Supreme Court, it is also simple to predict the nature
of the internal divisions. We lack sufficient data to offer predictions
for Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, but at least
in administrative law, it is more than mere guesswork to suggest that
both liberal and conservative agency decisions from a new
administration will produce the same kind of politicized voting, within
the Court, as has been observed under recent administrations. It
would not be at all surprising to find, for example, that a new
Democratic administration would suffer a number of losses in the
Court, at least if Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito show the
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
2208 [Vol. 58:2193
HeinOnline  -- 58 Duke L.J. 2208 2008-2009
2009] DEPOLITICIZING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
anticipated voting patterns, and if Justice Kennedy joins them a
significant percentage of the time.
II. FIVE MATrERS OF INTERPRETATION
At first glance, the most important lesson is plain: judicial review
of administrative action shows a strong effect from the political
inclinations of federal judges. In the abstract, this lesson is not exactly
stunning. The problem is that existing administrative law principles
are best understood as a self-conscious effort to prevent this state of
affairs. Under Chevron, courts are supposed to invalidate agency
interpretations of law only if the governing statute is clear or if the
interpretation is unreasonable.65 The doctrine and the practice sharply
diverge because the doctrine is an effort to prevent the kinds of
disparities now observed on both the Supreme Court and the courts
of appeals. And as the Court understands the "arbitrary or
capricious" standard, agency judgments of policy and fact are to be
invalidated if they are unreasonable or senseless, not because they
run afoul of judicial policy preferences.66 Here too the doctrine and
the practice sharply diverge, at least on the courts of appeals, where
statistical tests are possible. In an especially important domain, we
seem to have vindicated certain claims about judicial policy
preferences associated with the legal realist movement.67
The partisan voting patterns seem to call out for some kind of
remedy. But of course the evidence is not simple to interpret.
Consider five difficulties.
A. Who Is Partisan?
Begin with voting patterns on the Supreme Court. Is it altogether
clear that Justices Thomas and Stevens are the most partisan or that
the two opposing "blocks" show high (and nearly equivalent) levels of
65. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984)
(explaining that a reviewing court must ask "[f]irst... whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue," and if it has not, whether the agency's interpretation is
"reasonable").
66. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) ("The scope of review under the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard is narrow and a court
is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.").
67. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 846-50 (providing empirical support for the
contention that judicial policy preferences play a role in judges' decisions about whether
agencies have behaved unreasonably).
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partisan voting? A skeptic would insist that in order to answer that
question, we cannot simply stare at the numbers.6' We also need to
know something about the merits-about whether agencies are
actually interpreting statutes correctly. If, for example, liberal agency
decisions are more likely to be inconsistent with the statutory text,
then Justice Scalia and Thomas, who seem to show a significant
partisan "skew" in their voting patterns, might be neutral in their
practice, whatever the numbers suggest. Or if conservative agency
decisions are more typically inconsistent with the law, then Justice
Stevens might be the nonpartisan one notwithstanding the 40 percent
gap reflected in his voting pattern. The various rankings assume that
liberal agency decisions and conservative agency decisions are equally
likely to be inconsistent with the law. Why should we believe that this
assumption is correct?
The same point holds for the courts of appeals. It is true that
Republican appointees are more likely to vote to uphold conservative
agency decisions than liberal ones and that Democratic appointees
show the opposite pattern. But to evaluate this finding, it would be
important to learn about the nature of the EPA and NLRB decisions
in the relevant period. Perhaps one set of decisions is systematically
likely to be unreasonable or arbitrary. Perhaps partisan voting is
limited to one or another side; perhaps Republican appointees or
Democratic appointees are simply applying the law.
Even if this objection turns out to be valid, the problem of
partisan voting remains; the only qualification would be that such
voting would be limited to one or another set of judges. Moreover, it
is unlikely that the objection is valid, at least in its most ambitious
forms. Neither the Supreme Court nor the courts of appeals reviews
all EPA and NLRB decisions, or even a majority of them. Within the
Court, the sample is generally limited to cases that are both important
and difficult, and to be seen as worth litigating by both sides; in such
cases, a consistent error rate, from one or another side, would be a
surprise. Within the lower courts, reasonable arguments are usually
made on behalf of the competing views. From our own reading of the
cases, it does not seem that liberal agency decisions or conservative
68. This point is put in a broader context in a highly instructive essay by Professor Posner.
Eric Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial Bias Studies for
Political and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853, 870 (2008) ("[I]t should now be
clear that evaluating justices is more complicated than counting up their liberal and conservative
votes.").
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ones are systematically more likely to be in violation of the governing
statute (or the clear text) or arbitrary as a matter of fact or policy. To
be sure, a careful investigation of the merits might require some
amendments of the basic account we are offering, but the significant
differences in voting patterns are most unlikely to be understandable
in terms that neglect the political predictions of federal judges.
B. How Large a Problem?
It is legitimate to wonder about the magnitude of the problem. If
Republican appointees showed a 10 percent liberal voting rate and
Democratic appointees a 90 percent liberal voting rate, there would
be good reason for alarm. But the overall partisan difference is far
smaller than that-17 percent in the Chevron cases69 and 12 percent in
the arbitrariness cases.7" Is that difference large enough to justify
reforms or even substantial concern? It is clear that Democratic
appointees are voting in favor of companies and against public
interest groups in a large percentage of cases (about one-third of the
time in the entire data set)-and that Republican appointees are
often voting in favor of public interest groups and against companies
(over two-fifths of the time in the entire data set). 71 Far more often
than not, the two sets of judges are in accord. Is there a serious
problem to be solved?
This question might be pressed with special concern by those
who emphasize the selection of cases for litigation.72 People (and their
lawyers) are unlikely to challenge agency action unless they have a
significant chance of success. Agencies are unlikely to proceed in the
first instance unless they have a plausible legal basis for doing so. The
cases studied here are a small sliver or band of imaginable disputes,
consisting only of those agency decisions that litigants are prepared to
challenge and that agencies are prepared to defend. In such cases,
even a significant disparity between Republican and Democratic
voting patterns should not be taken as politics run rampant.
The point is correct. But it should not be overstated. In one
sense, our estimates understate the actual influence of ideology, for
the reason that we have just identified. When an agency must defend
69. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
71. See Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges, supra note 1, at 849 tbl.7.
72. For a discussion, see infra note 92 and accompanying text.
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a liberal decision before a conservative court, it is more likely to
settle, and when an agency must defend a conservative decision
before a liberal court, it is more likely to settle. The observed court
decisions are therefore drawn from cases in which settlement is less
likely, and the set of observed decisions does not encompass these
cases (we do not know exactly how many there are) in which the
judicial outcome would likely be predictably ideological. Were we to
observe a counterfactual world in which these settling cases
proceeded, the observed decisions would include a larger share of
(and thus a higher rate of) predictably ideological judicial decisions.
Moreover, it remains true that notwithstanding the evident
aspiration of both Chevron and State Farm, politicized voting patterns
are both significant and unmistakable in the federal courts, at least on
unified panels. Recall that in Chevron cases, a Democratic appointee
on a unified panel is 32 percent more likely to vote in favor of liberal
agency decisions (86 percent validation rate) than conservative agency
decisions (54 percent validation rate)-and that a Republican
appointee on a unified panel is 49 percent more likely to vote in favor
of conservative agency decisions (100 percent validation rate) than
liberal agency decisions (51 percent validation rate)." In a system
committed to the rule of law, and to similar treatment of the similarly
situated, this is a serious problem.
C. Ex Ante Versus Ex Post
Empirical tests can easily study decisions ex post, to see what
kinds of voting patterns are displayed by federal judges. But an
important question, and perhaps an even more important one,
involves the ex ante incentives imposed on federal agencies. On an
optimistic account, the situation is far better ex ante than ex post.
As things now stand, agencies can be seen to face a kind of
lottery. Within a certain range, their decisions will certainly be
upheld, no matter the composition of the panel; and if the agency
plainly violates the statutory text or acts in a patently arbitrary way,
its decision will be invalidated, regardless of who sits on the reviewing
court. And across a certain space of alternatives, there will be some
uncertainty, with a range of probabilities of invalidation, depending
on the composition of the panel. In that range, the agency's lawyers
might be prepared to conclude that the relevant decision can be
73. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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plausibly defended. Within a certain domain of that range, the
lawyers will add that the decision is more likely than not, or less likely
than not, to be upheld in court. But they might be prepared to
acknowledge, if pressed, that the likelihood of validation is well above
50 percent before a panel consisting solely of Republican appointees
and well below 50 percent before a panel consisting solely of
Democratic appointees.
In these circumstances, how will the agency proceed? To answer
that question, we need to know something about the weight given to
the prospect of invalidation and about the agency's attitude toward
risk. Exactly how much does the agency care about surviving judicial
review? Is the agency risk averse or risk inclined? The agency will
face a probability distribution, and it will act in accordance with the
perceived risks. Suppose that for various reasons, the agency cares a
great deal about ensuring validation and also that the agency is risk
neutral. If the risk of invalidation is 60 percent before an all-
Democratic panel, but 35 percent before an all-Republican panel, an
agency can make the relevant calculations and proceed accordingly.
The overall likelihood of invalidation, given all the possible panel
compositions, might be 40 percent; and the agency might proceed as it
would, in the face of that risk, even if every possible panel was 40
percent likely to invalidate its decision. The key point is that whatever
the disparities across panels, there is an overall likelihood of
invalidation, and the agency can act with that figure in mind, just as it
would without such disparities. From the ex ante point of view, then,
what is the problem with politicized voting?
Here is another way to put the point. While we are unaware of
any empirical evidence on the question, agencies are likely to be
aware of the distribution of views on the federal judiciary, and if the
judiciary takes a sharp turn in one or another direction, agencies will
be affected. If, for example, a Democratic administration faced a
judiciary consisting mostly of Republican appointees, it would behave
differently from how it would behave if the judiciary consisted mostly
of Democratic appointees. And if politicized voting exists on a
judiciary within a specified distribution among Republican and
Democratic appointees, agencies will adjust accordingly. Without
politicized voting, there will be a certain likelihood of invalidation,
which agency lawyers might be able to specify; the same is true with
politicized voting. So long as agencies are attuned to the relevant
problems, there does not seem to be a great deal of difficulty ex ante.
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Three potential problems remain. A first concern is the
possibility that the panel lottery agencies face may not be a fair game.
If the composition of the federal courts were disproportionately
Republican (or Democratic), an agency would not have an equal
probability of facing a DDD and an RRR panel. A politically
unbalanced judiciary, as distinguished from a politically unbalanced
panel, implies shifts in the range of decisions that an agency can
expect will be validated. To continue the example above, if the risks
of invalidation before all-Democratic and all-Republican panels
remain unchanged, but the incidence of all-Democratic and all-
Republican panels change, the expected likelihood of invalidation
might rise from 40 percent to 60 percent. Or it might fall to 20
percent. It would remain true that agencies could know, ex ante,
about their probability of success. And it might be responded that
shifts in the composition of the federal judiciary are a legitimate
response to shifts in public opinion, as reflected in the inclinations of
the occupant of the White House. But movements in the expected
chance of invalidation are troubling to the extent that the agency's ex
ante prediction of its likelihood of success will shift with the expected
composition of the reviewing court.
Second, politicized voting by panels will influence the amount of
resources an agency invests in rendering decisions and defending
them in court. If the agency is risk averse, or if the risk of partisan
invalidation is high, an agency may double its efforts to demonstrate
the validity of its action. The additional resources spent bolstering its
decision exceed the investment the agency would have had it
anticipated facing a nonpoliticized panel. This sort of additional
expenditure seems more likely to occur in rulemaking rather than
adjudication. But the primary point is that a risk of politicized voting
will likely increase the effort devoted to showing reasonableness
beyond what would be spent in its absence. These additional
resources of course have an opportunity cost. They are drawn away
from other activities that the agency would otherwise pursue. Defense
of a clean-air regulation may come at the expense of creating a clean-
water regulation. For resource-constrained agencies-as all agencies
are-the possibility of a politicized panel could distort an agency's
allocation decisions.74
74. Naturally, the argument works the other way for politicized voting that favors an
agency. An increase in the chance that an agency faces a friendly reviewer may reduce the
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Third, politicized voting by panels may affect the content of
agency decisions. An agency may decide in good faith that a
particular policy would improve social welfare. But if the risk of a
politicized invalidation is high, the agency may decide that the
resources required to establish the validity of the policy before a
potentially hostile court are too great. The agency may then modify
the decision to make it more palatable to the expected panel but at
the cost of a reduced improvement in social welfare. Or the agency
may choose to forgo the decision altogether. In either case, politicized
review would result in the agency's curbing a socially beneficial
decision. There is ample evidence that effects of this sort do in fact
75
occur.
In addition to these ex ante consequences, the ex post
perspective matters as well. If important EPA rules are invalidated by
all-Democratic panels, while they would be upheld by all-Republican
panels, similarly situated litigants will be treated differently in a way
that ensures that the meaning of federal statutes turns on a kind of
lottery. If NLRB decisions are won by unions before DDD panels,
but by companies before RRR panels, something is seriously amiss.
Even if the current regime does not have significantly different
incentive effects from one with less politicized voting, it does serious
violence to the rule of law, and it has a significant effect on ultimate
outcomes.
D. Invalidations or Validations?
An independent question is whether the best reading of the
evidence emphasizes politicized invalidations. We have seen that the
Republican invalidation rate jumps when the agency decision is
liberal, and the Democratic invalidation rate jumps when the agency
decision is conservative. These points suggest that agencies are
probably losing many cases that they ought to win. But it is possible
that what has been uncovered are politically motivated validations.
Perhaps the real story is the relatively low invalidation rate when
resources an agency spends in establishing the validity of its decision, and this may be
undesirable when closer inquiry is warranted.
75. The best discussion remains the book by Professors Mashaw and Harfst. JERRY L.
MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 225 (1990) (discussing the
effects of aggressive judicial review on agency rulemaking, and noting that "[t]he result of
judicial requirements for comprehensive rationality has been a general suppression of the use of
rules").
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Republican appointees review conservative regulations and when
Democratic appointees review liberal ones. Perhaps conservative
decisions are being wrongly validated before all-Republican panels;
perhaps liberal agency decisions are being wrongly validated before
all-Democratic panels. Indeed, it is possible, in light of the data, that
the more serious problem consists of excessive numbers of
validations.
This point is indeed consistent with the evidence, and it has
important implications for possible responses. We will return to the
question in Part III.B.2.
E. Second-Order Diversity
Sometimes it is desirable to have diversity within institutions-as,
for example, in the context of national legislatures. But sometimes it
is desirable to have diversity across institutions-as, for example, in a
situation in which Massachusetts attempts some educational reforms
and Utah ventures others, or different law schools or economics
departments develop different "schools." Professor Heather Gerken
has written illuminatingly of the idea of "second-order diversity,"76
which exists when different institutions, with a degree of internal
unity, produce a kind of diversity from which society as a whole might
benefit. In some cases, second-order diversity should be the goal, not
first order. If, for example, society is able to learn a great deal from
institutions that are internally unified but different from one another,
and if those institutions do not do much damage to anyone, then
second-order diversity might be better than its first-order cousin.
In administrative law, we can find a high degree of second-order
diversity, made possible by unified panels. Might this be desirable?
Consider the following account. With unified panels, a large number
of ideas will inevitably make their way onto the pages of federal court
opinions. RRR panels will offer distinctive interpretations of the
Clean Air Act and the National Labor Relations Act; DDD panels
will offer distinctive interpretations of their own. Perhaps the legal
system benefits from this level of diversity. When courts of appeals
are divided, the Supreme Court will ultimately decide, with the
76. See Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity and Disaggregated Democracy, 118
HARV. L. REv. 1099, 1102-03 (2005) (explaining "first-order diversity" as "the normative vision
associated with statistical integration, the hope that democratic bodies will someday mirror the
polity" and "second-order diversity" as "involv[ing] variation among decisionmaking bodies,
not within them .... [and] foster[ing] diversity without mandating uniformity").
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benefit of the additional information provided by a wide array of
views within the lower courts.
In some domains, this defense of second-order diversity within
the federal courts has a great deal of plausibility. In constitutional
law, for example, the system as a whole probably benefits from RRR
and DDD panels, which produce a range of disparate analyses of
issues involving the Second Amendment, abortion, affirmative action,
campaign finance regulation, and much more. The Supreme Court
and the culture as a whole benefit from such analyses. But the
defense is far less plausible in the context of administrative law. In
almost all of the relevant cases, the decision of the court of appeals is
effectively final, because the Supreme Court hears only an
exceedingly small percentage of them, and most turn on complex
issues of fact or policy or on relatively technical issues of statutory
construction. If an RRR panel concludes that the NLRB improperly
found the facts and rules in favor of a company challenging a finding
of an unfair labor practice, or if a DDD panel rejects the EPA's
interpretation of the Clean Air Act in favor of that offered by the
Sierra Club, the likelihood of some social benefit from a hypothetical
increase in "diversity" is very low. In these circumstances, it is not
easy to defend the status quo by reference to the interest in second-
order diversity.
III. SOLUTIONS
Let us now turn to sets of solutions. The first involves self-
correction without doctrinal change, brought about by judges' own
understanding of the problem of politicized administrative law. The
second set includes doctrinal responses, taking the form of new
developments involving the governing legal principles. The third and
most ambitious set involves institutional innovation, as, for example,
through voting rules or requirements of mixed panels. The fourth set
focuses on the confirmation process.
An important point before we begin: evaluation of any solutions
must be based not only on their content, but also on an understanding
of who, exactly, is implementing those solutions. Self-correction
would of course be possible without legislative change or any kind of
direction from the Supreme Court. Doctrinal changes would require
the Court to reformulate or at least to clarify the underlying
principles. Voting rules, or requirements of mixed panels, might well
require congressional action. Solutions that call for large-scale
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institutional change might run into objections from the standpoint of
feasibility, if only because such change is difficult to produce.
A. Self-Correction
1. Knowledge as Corrective, Sunlight as Disinfectant. Some of the
evidence catalogued here should be taken as highly embarrassing to
the federal judiciary. Most federal judges would not like to think that
in reviewing agency action, their voting patterns show a significant
influence from the party affiliation of the president who appointed
them. Perhaps a better understanding of the situation could provide a
safeguard against politicized voting. On an optimistic view, judicial
awareness of the underlying patterns might provide a degree of help;
it might even produce a form of "debiasing." Justice Louis Brandeis
famously said that "sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.""
Perhaps a little sunlight, with respect to voting patterns, might induce
a degree of self-consciousness and self-scrutiny, thus reducing
politicized voting. At the very least, the data suggest that judges on
unified panels should be cautious about behaving in a way that fits
with partisan predictions.
Here is the basic idea. There are many demonstrations of
politicized voting, undertaken by those who have studied judicial
voting patterns, and they continue to be undertaken. These
demonstrations might become generally known, as the key findings
are found in scholarly outlets or the popular media. To the extent that
RRR and DDD panels are pervasively found to show an ideological
skew, judges might be made aware of that fact. And if that occurs, the
relevant behavior might change.
This is certainly possible, but there is no reason for confidence in
this prospect. It is an understatement to say that most judges do not
spend a great deal of time reading academic work, and studies of
judicial behavior are not likely to come to their attention. And even if
some judges become aware of relevant studies, perhaps through more
popular outlets, a significant effect on their behavior would be
surprising. No one should doubt that judges act in good faith, and
when they vote to strike down or to uphold agency action, they are
behaving in accordance with the law as they understand it. Note that
Supreme Court Justices are the judges subject to the most persistent
77. See Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT
92 (1914).
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scrutiny by both the public and by a professional class of experts. Yet
they remain consistently ideological in their voting. Perhaps an
improved understanding of the degree of politicized voting could
produce some good, but it is unlikely to make a significant
contribution to solving the problem.
2. Warning Flags and Reviewing the Reviewers. A mildly more
aggressive response would be to suggest that when a DDD panel or
an RRR panel goes in the expected direction, a warning flag has been
raised, one that justifies some form of oversight and review. Suppose,
for example, that a RRR panel has struck down some regulation from
the EPA, accepting a company's claim that the regulation is arbitrary
or in violation of statute. If the EPA seeks en banc or Supreme Court
review, there is special reason to take the request seriously. Or if a
DDD panel has acted in a predictable fashion in an important case
involving the NLRB, and the NLRB seeks certiorari, the Court has
an additional reason to wonder about whether the panel might have
erred.
It is true that there are evident risks with giving a great deal of
weight to panel composition. What matters is the court's conclusion
and analysis, not the political affiliation of the appointing president.
At the same time, the existence of a unified panel, reaching the
predictable conclusion, does provide a signal that the conclusion and
the analysis might be skewed. Indeed, it is likely that judgments about
en banc review, and about whether to grant certiorari, are sometimes
influenced by an appreciation of the composition of the panel. But
this response would be at best a partial response to the politicized-
voting situation. It would impose on agencies the perhaps
considerable costs of appeal, an expense that would be spared if
politicized decisions were avoided in the first instance. En banc
review is necessarily rare, and agencies seek Supreme Court review
infrequently, especially when their decision is invalidated as arbitrary
or capricious; such invalidations depend on particular facts and are
most unlikely to attract the Court's attention. 8 Even when agencies
appeal, as we have seen, the Supreme Court grants certiorari in only a
78. Robert J. Hume, Administrative Appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court: The Importance of
Legal Signals, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 625, 632-33 (2007) (explaining that petitions are
less likely to occur when a court invalidates an agency decision as arbitrary and capricious
because, "[ulnlike cases based on the Constitution, an agency's interpretation of a statute, or
some other substantive grounds, cases that require an agency to improve its reasoning are
normally viewed as frivolous by the Justices and denied review").
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small fraction of cases.79 A warning flag may well be appropriate, but
it cannot suffice to eliminate politicized voting.
3. Political Rankings. We have ranked Supreme Court Justices
in terms of politicized voting, and it would be possible to be far more
systematic in this vein, covering lower courts as well. Rankings might
increase the transparency of the courts, which might enhance the
public's understanding of the judiciary, and importantly, might give
judges an additional reason to reflect before rendering decisions that
fit with political expectations. Such rankings might be offered in
scholarly journals or in more popular outlets.
On the other hand, judicial rankings run into some serious
objections. They may erode public confidence in courts; for some
observers, rankings might supplant evaluation of judicial opinions and
reinforce a cynical view that law is always politics in the crudest sense.
Rankings might serve to distract judges from rendering decisions in
accordance with law and encourage them to burnish their public
perception as neutral. Finally, the statistics underlying any rankings
are likely to be too crude, failing to capture important dimensions of
judicial judgment.
B. Doctrinal Solutions
1. Rethinking Mead. Chevron was intended to eliminate the role
of judicial policy judgments from review of agency action; it has failed
to do so. At the same time, the Court has retreated, in significant
ways, from the Chevron ,framework by reducing deference in certain
classes of cases. A relatively modest doctrinal response to the
situation described here would be to rethink the Court's most serious
retreat, in United States v. Mead Corp.,80 on the ground that it has a
serious unanticipated side effect, which is to increase the
politicization of administrative law.
To make a long and complex story too short and simple,l Mead
draws a distinction between two kinds of deference to agency
interpretations of law. The higher form of deference, reflected in
Chevron itself, applies when agencies have exercised delegated
79. Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 DUKE
L.J. 1143, 1194 & n.215 (2005).
80. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
81. For details, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187
(2006).
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authority to make rules or to promulgate orders." The lower form of
deference, reflected in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,83 might apply when
agencies have not exercised such authority; the word "might" is
necessary because the Court has not established clear ground rules"
An apparent rationale of Mead is that if agencies have gone through
rulemaking procedures or through the adjudicative process, we have
some guarantee of fairness and deliberation, in a way that justifies
heightened deference.85 If agencies have not gone through the
relevant processes, perhaps the risk of unfairness or unreasonableness
is heightened, in a way that justifies a firmer judicial hand.
The distinction between Skidmore and Chevron raises many
complexities, and the doctrine is producing a great deal of confusion
in the lower courts."' Intuition and common sense suggest another
problem: it would appear likely that Skidmore review, authorized by
Mead, may well ensure not a firmer judicial hand, but a situation in
which judicial policy preferences play a (still) larger role than they do
under Chevron. To evaluate this speculation, a great deal of empirical
work would be necessary. But if Chevron has at least some kind of
disciplining effect on judicial policy judgments, then Mead is likely to
increase politicization.
What does current evidence show? A noteworthy fact: on the
Supreme Court itself, politicized voting does not seem to be greater
under Skidmore than under Chevron. The Stevens-Souter-Breyer-
Ginsburg group shows a 27 percent greater willingness to validate
liberal agency decisions than conservative agency decisions under
Chevron; the corresponding figure is 23 percent under Skidmore.
7
82. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
83. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). An exceedingly valuable empirical study
is Kristin Hickman & Matthew Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107
COLUM. L. REv. 1235 (2007).
84. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 ("The fair measure of deference to an agency administering its
own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the
degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the
persuasiveness of the agency's position." (footnotes omitted)).
85. See id. at 229-30 (characterizing express congressional authorizations of notice-and-
comment rulemaking and formal adjudication as "good indicator[s] of delegation meriting
Chevron treatment" because they "tend[] to foster the fairness and deliberation that should
underlie a pronouncement of such force").
86. See Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 347 (2003)
(calling the D.C. Circuit's "Mead-related work product ... in a nontrivial number of cases,
flawed or incoherent").
87. Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges, supra note 1, at 846.
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The Rehnquist-Scalia-Thomas group shows a 30 percent greater
willingness to validate conservative agency decisions than liberal
agency decisions under Chevron; the difference is 37 percent under
Skidmore.' Because of the small numbers of votes, neither of these
differences is statistically significant.
We do not know whether greater differences would be found in
the lower courts; the issue would be well worth investigating. No clear
evidence shows whether courts that use Skidmore, rather than
Chevron, end up with more invalidations, greater politicization, or
both. But it is possible that the use of Skidmore, rather than Chevron,
does not create more in the way of either invalidations or politicized
voting. Further empirical work would be extremely helpful in this
domain.89
The more general point is that politicized voting remains high
under Chevron, and hence the doctrinal shift from Skidmore to
Chevron would not be likely to do a great deal to reduce the problem.
The key data involve voting patterns under Chevron, and more
general use of the Chevron framework would seem to leave those
patterns intact.
2. Increased Deference.
a. The Central Idea. A natural response to the data would be to
argue for increased deference, or a kind of "super-Chevron," in the
relevant domains. If Republican appointees are invalidating liberal
agency decisions at a high rate, and if Democratic appointees are
invalidating conservative agency decisions at a high rate, then we
might want more deferential review from both sides. If the evident
aspiration of Chevron has failed, there seems to be strong reason to
reduce the intensity of judicial review of agency interpretations of
law. And if arbitrariness review is being conducted in a way that
shows a significant effect from judicial policy preferences, then the
most obvious response would be to reduce the intensity of such
review. What is now a "hard look" might be transformed into a "soft
look."
There are, however, three objections to this recommendation.'
88. Id.
89. Relevant data and arguments can be found in Eskridge & Baer, supra note 2 passim.
90. A possible doctrinal solution, in some domains, would be to prefer rules over
standards. It has been shown that this approach can serve to reduce the effects of judicial
ideology. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of
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b. Objections. The first objection is that a degree of politicization
may be a necessary price to pay for forms of judicial review that have
otherwise desirable consequences. Increased deference may, for
example, eliminate a valuable ex ante deterrent to careless or
arbitrary decisions at the agency level.9' The benefits of that deterrent
effect may outweigh the costs of politicized review. We have seen that
in a sense, agencies face an ex ante "policy lottery" once their
decisions are challenged because they cannot know whether the panel
will be RRR, DDD, RRD, or DDR. The existence of that lottery is
likely to ensure better decisions simply because of a certain
probability of invalidation. The point applies both to agency
interpretations of law and agency judgments of policy and fact. In
both cases, agencies are likely to be disciplined by the existing
standards of review. To put the point another way: the correlations
between judicial ideology and validation rates do not demonstrate
that all things considered, the current doctrinal balance between
judicial ideology and agency error is inappropriate. Even if we could
reduce those correlations, we might not be satisfied, because the risk
of agency error might increase.
The second objection is that statistical patterns of the sort
described here might rematerialize even with increased deference.
Indeed, reduced deference might produce precisely the same
patterns. Even after a decision to strengthen Chevron deference, new
researchers might discern politicized voting of the same level that we
have reported here. The reason is that litigants should be expected to
adjust their behavior to the existing standard of review. If deference
were increased, some cases would not be brought that were brought
before the increase, and the level of validation might therefore
remain identical. And in the (by hypothesis close) cases that would be
brought under the new standard, political judgments might inevitably
Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493 (2008). In the context at hand, however, it
is difficult to see how this solution might be made to work.
91. William F. Pederson, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38,
60 (1975) ("It is a great tonic to a program to discover that even if a regulation can be slipped or
wrestled through various layers of internal or external review [inside the bureaucracy] ... the
final and most prestigious reviewing forum of all-a circuit court of appeals-will inquire into
the minute details of methodology .... ").
92. See Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges, supra note 1, at 869 ("[S]o long as there is some room
for review, political differences will matter at the point where that review occurs. If, for
example, the agency must be upheld unless the statute is entirely without ambiguity, then
litigants will challenge agency action only when the statute is (arguably) entirely without
ambiguity, and then agencies will interpret statutes aggressively in their preferred directions.").
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play a role, producing disparities of the sort we have described. In fact
we might even venture an invariance hypothesis: because litigants
adjust their behavior to the existing standard of review, the level of
validations and the degree of politicized voting will be unaffected by
that standard.
It is not clear that this invariance proposition is correct.93 If
judicial review were entirely unavailable, of course, there would be no
politicized voting. But if judicial review were available but
exceptionally deferential, is it obvious that the rate of validation and
politicized voting would remain constant? The answer depends on the
responsiveness of litigants and agencies to changes in the scope of
review. If neither litigants nor agencies are highly responsive, we
should expect that increased deference would increase validation
rates and decrease politicized voting. If litigants are highly responsive,
but agencies are not, we might expect that increased deference would
have little effect. However we analyze the details, the general
objection is straightforward: an increase in deference might have little
or no effect on politicized voting.
The best response to this objection is that even if the statistics
remain the same, the politicized voting is in an important sense less
damaging, because with greater deference, agencies are given greater
room to maneuver from Republican appointees and Democratic
appointees alike. A softening of review should ensure that political
differences among the two sets of appointees would have a
correspondingly smaller effect on ultimate outcomes. Even if the
statistical analysis looks the same, a softening of review would ensure
a reduced effect from politicized voting.
The third objection is that the real problem may be politicized
validations, not politicized invalidations, and if this is so, then more
deferential review would seem perverse. As we have suggested,
nothing in the evidence outlined here demonstrates that the level of
validations is too high. The real story may be the deferential approach
of RRR panels to conservative agency decisions and of DDD panels
to liberal agency decisions. If this is so, then a softening of review may
be affirmatively perverse, because it will increase the deference of
RRR and DDD panels to decisions to which they are already too
deferential.
93. See id. at 869-70 (discussing "[t]he inevitability of politics").
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c. Evaluation. It emerges that a general increase in deference
should reduce disparities in politicized invalidations. To that extent, it
would indeed be responsive to a plausible reading of the evidence
sketched here. But the price of this gain may be too large; to answer
that question, we need to know more about what is gained and what
is lost. And for those who are concerned about politically motivated
validations, increased deference would sacrifice a great deal. We are
left with the conclusion that both RRR and DDD panels should be
careful about both validations and invalidations that square with their
predicted inclinations, but with an understanding that a softening of
judicial review is not fully justified by, or an adequate response to,
evidence of politicized voting. Our own conclusion, admittedly not
compelled by the data, is that some softening of review would be
warranted, because politicized invalidations are the most serious
problem. Most of the time, it is more troublesome if courts are
striking down agency action than upholding it, because the political
process contains a range of safeguards against arbitrary or unlawful
action in the first instance.
C. Institutional Solutions
Perhaps the best solution does not involve self-help or doctrinal
change; perhaps it is institutional. But what form would an
institutional solution take? And how would we produce that solution?
We can imagine several possibilities.
1. Clearer Statutes. If Congress spoke unambiguously, partisan
voting should not be anticipated, because all judges would agree
about statutory meaning. Recall that in most administrative law cases
in the data set, Republican and Democratic appointees agree.
Certainly in a regime governed by Chevron, truly unambiguous
statutes would not produce divisions between RRR and DDD panels.
Indeed, truly unambiguous statutes would not need Chevron to
squelch those divisions. Perhaps the lesson of politicized voting is
simple: Congress should legislate more clearly.
But there are two problems with this solution-one small, the
other large. The small one is that because of the selection point,
political voting should be expected in those cases that end up being
litigated. This is a small point because even if we see such voting, it
would be along a modest margin; the stakes would be lowered. The
larger point is that there are formidable objections to the idea that
Congress should enact clearer statutes. In many cases, Congress lacks
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the information to legislate with particularity, and greater specificity
would likely diminish social welfare rather than increase it.94 Greater
specificity on Congress's part may well ensure that committees, some
of them highly susceptible to interest-group power,95 would be
responsible for the content of federal law.96 It is true that
unambiguous legislation would reduce politicized voting, but it would
also have a series of undesirable consequences.
2. Supermajorities. Might voting rules help? In an illuminating
essay, Professors Jacob Gersen and Adrian Vermeule argue that the
goals of the Chevron approach might be implemented, not through
doctrine, but through a special voting rule.97 Suppose that agency
action could not be struck down, under the Chevron framework,
unless all three judges supported that result. At first glance, a
unanimity requirement would ensure against politicized invalidations.
It follows that if the goal is to depoliticize administrative law, a voting
rule might do far better than doctrinal innovation. And if judicial
review of agency action for arbitrariness shows a political bias, a
voting rule would seem to be a sensible solution. Perhaps agency
action should not be invalidated as arbitrary unless all three judges,
on a three-judge panel, can be persuaded to vote for invalidation.
In some domains, a special voting rule would undoubtedly make
a great deal of sense. Unfortunately, the proposal runs into several
objections. There is an obvious practical problem: who would enact a
supermajority requirement? Judges are unlikely to have either the
desire or the will to do so. At first glance, Congress would have to
implement this response, and legislation to this effect seems most
unlikely, in part because well-organized private groups would work
94. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1745-48 (2002).
95. See Richard L. Hall & Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the
Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 797, 798 (1990)
("Students of Congress have long contended that interest group influence flourishes at the
committee level .... "); Ken Kollman, Inviting Friends to Lobby: Interest Groups, Ideological
Bias, and Congressional Committees, 41 AM. J. POL. SC. 519, 522 (1997) ("[A] general
consensus exists.., that interest groups are vital to many committee decisions.").
96. See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS 26 (1999).
97. See Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J.
676, 676 (2007) ("A voting-rule version of Chevron would... allow more precise calibration of
the level of judicial deference over time, and holding the level of deference constant, a voting
rule would produce less variance in deference across courts and over time, yielding a lower level
of legal uncertainty than does the doctrinal version of Chevron.").
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hard to defeat it, in part because it is foreign to our traditions. It
might well be best to attempt to counteract politicized voting in a
more conventional and less unprecedented way.
Moreover, the data suggest another objection to this approach, at
least if it is intended as a response to politicized voting in
administrative law. The most serious problem comes on RRR and
DDD panels; it is on such panels that the most politicized voting can
be found. On RRD and RDD panels, the role of politics is limited
and even hard to detect. The evidence suggests that a unanimity
requirement would provide help where no help is required and would
provide no help where help is greatly needed. It emerges that the
Gersen/Vermeule proposal is a plausible if partial response to the risk
of excessive invalidations, but it would not solve the problem of
politicized administrative law. And for those who suspect politically
motivated validations, a voting rule, of the sort that Professors
Gersen and Vermeule recommend, would seem perverse. Unanimity
might be required to uphold rather than invalidate agency action; but
to say the least, that approach would present problems of its own.
3. Mixed Panels. Much of modern adjudication is undertaken by
federal administrative agencies. Indeed, the National Labor Relations
Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal
Communications Commission do much of their business via
adjudication. By federal statute, these and other agencies must have
mixed compositions, in the sense that no more than a bare majority of
their members can come from a single political party.98 Recent
evidence shows that the partisan affiliation of board members
predicts their votes and suggests that mandated partisan composition
matters within these agencies." Building on these precedents, we
might be tempted to suggest that federal courts of appeals do better if
they have mixed compositions-and that in certain cases, at least,
mixed compositions might be mandated."'°
98. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006) (requiring bipartisan composition of the Securities
and Exchange Commission).
99. Daniel E. Ho, Congressional Agency Control: The Impact of Statutory Partisan
Requirements on Regulation 35 (Feb. 12, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://dho.stanford.edu/research/partisan.pdf (reviewing the empirical literature and finding that
partisan affiliation of Federal Communications Commission commissioners correlates with
voting patterns, even after controlling for the party of the appointing president).
100. See Tiller & Cross, supra note 16, at 215 (calling for mandating politically mixed panels
rather than pure random assignment).
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As a response to the problems found here, there is a great deal to
be said on behalf of panels of mixed composition. If DDD and RRR
panels are the most serious problem, then that problem would appear
to be solved by ensuring against unified panels. But a requirement of
mixed panels would create both administrative and symbolic
problems, and there may be pragmatic objections as well. Assignment
to three-judge panels is now random, °' and it would be quite
complicated to take steps to ensure that all such panels, in
administrative law cases, have both Democratic and Republican
appointees. In addition, judges are supposed to leave their political
commitments behind once they become judges, and a requirement of
mixed panels might seem objectionable insofar as it would be an
acknowledgement that political commitments matter to judging. That
acknowledgement might entrench the very problem that it is intended
to reduce. Perhaps both Republican and Democratic appointees
would conceive of themselves, to a somewhat greater degree, as
political partisans, simply because the requirement of mixed
composition would suggest as much.
The question, then, is whether the problem of politicized
administrative law is sufficiently severe as to justify strong medicine
of this kind. The answer may be affirmative, at least in cases in which
the stakes are especially high. The issue is whether other, less
aggressive responses can provide adequate safeguards.
4. Rethinking Judicial Selection and Confirmation. Perhaps the
most straightforward response to politicized voting would be to alter
the process of judicial selection and confirmation. The goal would be
to produce smaller differences, or no differences, between
Republican and Democratic appointees in the domain of
administrative law. A president could certainly move in this direction
on his own, perhaps by seeking to appoint judges whose voting
patterns are less likely to be politicized, perhaps by appointing a mix
of judges whose overall patterns would be less ideological. The
Senate could act either on its own or with the president, aiming to
ensure less partisan appointees or an ideological mix for any
particular administration.
An approach of this kind would have real advantages, especially
insofar as it would move the emphasis, in judicial appointments, away
from ideology and toward professionalism. But it too would run into
101. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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objections. Administrative law is not the most salient domain of the
appointments process (however much administrative law specialists
may lament that admittedly unfortunate fact!). The high-profile
issues, typically involving constitutional law, will inevitably dominate
the discussion. Any president is likely to want to appoint judges who
fall, broadly speaking, into one kind of camp rather than another, and
at least for the Supreme Court, a degree of politicization is inevitable.
There is a further point. A president, and a Senate, might
reasonably believe, on some occasions, that the judiciary has already
been "skewed," and that for new appointments, taking account of
likely voting patterns is a way of redressing the balance. Having said
that, we believe that it is entirely appropriate for administrations to
seek a mix of appointees, rather than to steer the judiciary in a single
direction. But a defense of this claim would take us well beyond our
topic here."
CONCLUSION
In the recent period, administrative law has been highly
politicized in the sense that the voting patterns of Republican
appointees are significantly different from the voting patterns of
Democratic appointees. The politicized patterns are strikingly similar
in Chevron cases and in arbitrariness cases. In both domains, federal
judges show especially politicized voting patterns on unified panels,
where the disparities between Republican and Democratic
appointees are very large. On the Supreme Court itself, many of the
Justices show an ideological "skew" in their application of the
Chevron framework.
It is reasonably clear that no one should be happy about this
state of affairs. It is much less clear what should be done about it.
Sunlight is often a disinfectant, and perhaps a broader knowledge of
recent patterns will supply a kind of corrective; we have suggested
that publicized "rankings" of judges, in terms of politicization, might
provide some help. There is certainly reason for greater skepticism
about courts of appeals decisions when unified panels reach a
conclusion that fits with their expected predilections. Doctrinal
changes, calling for heightened deference to agency action, would
decrease the likelihood of politicized invalidations. It would not,
102. For a relevant discussion, see generally David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The
Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491 (1992).
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however, decrease the likelihood of politicized validations, and that
problem would be made worse by doctrinal changes producing
greater deference.
The largest lesson is that there is more reason to trust the
outcomes of mixed panels than the outcomes of unified panels.
Whether mixed panels should be required is not a question that the
evidence can itself answer; but it is a question that the evidence
makes it reasonable to ask. Our largest hope is that an understanding
of politicized administrative law, and of possible responses, will bear
on many domains in which federal judges are divided along
predictable lines, and indeed other domains in which entrenched
differences, and potential biases, create potential difficulties for both
private and public institutions.
HeinOnline  -- 58 Duke L.J. 2230 2008-2009
